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Abstract
Absentmindedness is a special case of imperfect recall which ac-
cording to Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a) leads to time inconsisten-
cies. Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997a) question their argument and
show how dynamic inconsistencies can be resolved. The present pa-
per explores this issue from a descriptive point of view by examining
the behavior of absentminded individuals in a laboratory environment.
Absentmindedness is manipulated in two ways. In one treatment, it
is induced by cognitively overloading participants. In the other, it is
imposed by randomly matching decisions with decision nodes in the
information set. The results provide evidence for time inconsistencies
in all treatments. We introduce a behavioral principal, which best
explains the data.
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Dynamic consistency is a compelling fundamental tenet of rational behav-
ior: once a decision maker makes a plan, she should carry it out as long as
there is no relevant change in the decision environment. Notwithstanding its
normative appeal, the principle of dynamic consistency has been systemati-
cally invalidated by empirical evidence, therefore calling for a revision of the
normative theories, as in the case of decision-making under risk (e.g. Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979) or ambiguity (e.g. Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989;
Epstein and Schmeidler, 2003). Conversely, Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a;
henceforth PR) have drawn attention to a particular case of dynamic incon-
sistency that arises exactly from standard rational theory. PR considered
a speciﬁc type of imperfect recall, which they termed “absentmindedness”,
where a single history passes through two decision nodes in an agent’s infor-
mation set. They showed that in the analysis of decision problems featuring
absentmindedness, traditional game theory yields time inconsistencies.
Absentmindedness and the paradoxical results associated with it are
most usefully illustrated by the problem of the “absentminded driver”, a
simpliﬁed version of which is presented in Figure 1’s game tree.1







The absentminded driver starts her journey at node X where she can
either “exit” (for a payoﬀ of a) or “continue” to Y where she faces the same
choice. If at Y she exits, she gets a payoﬀ of b; if she continues beyond
Y , she earns c. The driver suﬀers from absentmindedness in the sense that
1We speak of game (rather than decision) tree to stay in the framework of game theory.
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in the same information set. PR demonstrated that if the highest payoﬀ
is at the second intersection (i.e., b > a; c),2 an agent’s plan before she
starts her journey (the planning stage) is inconsistent with her beliefs once
she reaches a decision node (the action stage) as long as she assigns some
positive probability to being at Y . In other words, the decision maker is
tempted to change her initial plan when the time comes to make a decision.3
This observation was termed by PR “the absentminded driver paradox”.
In the same issue of Games and Economic Behavior, Aumann, Hart
and Perry (1997a; henceforth AHP) replied to PR. AHP argued that opti-
mization at the information set should be carried out with respect to the
strategy at the current decision node while considering the rest of the play
as ﬁxed. AHP showed how in this case the planning-optimal decision is also
action-optimal, thus resolving the paradox.4
Notwithstanding having been brought out more than a decade ago, the
absentminded driver paradox and the theoretical controversy surrounding it
have not yet been settled. Game theory has proven unable to provide a gen-
eral normative prescription because diﬀerent game-theoretical approaches
lead to conﬂicting results. Indeed, while AHP argue for the planning-optimal
strategy as the unique normative prescription, Binmore (1996) considers any
non-committing plan irrelevant to the analysis.
Unlike previous studies, in this paper we explore the paradox from a
descriptive point of view.5 Accordingly, we implement the problem depicted
2Throughout the paper we use the terms ‘exit’, ‘intersection’, and ‘node’ interchange-
ably.
3Note that the highest payoﬀ b can never be reached through pure or mixed strate-
gies. The following analyses therefore always consider behavioral strategies, allowing the
decision maker to randomize over her actions, independently at X and at Y . Thus, the
behavioral strategy is a distribution over the possible actions available at the information
set. An action is chosen independently according to the behavioral strategy each time the
information set is reached.
4This notion is mathematically equivalent to a modiﬁed multiselves approach (where
a person is viewed as consisting of diﬀerent temporal selves).
5Theoretical discussions of the paradoxes arising under absentmindedness can be found
in Battigali (1997), Gilboa (1997), Grove and Halpern (1997), Halpern (1997), Aumann,
Hart, and Perry (1997b), and Lipman (1997), which are summarized and countered in
Piccione and Rubinstein (1997b), Binmore (1996), and Board (2003). So far the exper-
imental studies of absentmindedness did not attempt a direct test of the absentminded
driver paradox. Huck and M¨ uller (2002) tested a related game which is comparable only to
the action stage, while Deck and Sarangi (2009) aimed to show the possibility of inducing
absentmindedness in an experimental setting and do not provide a systematic test of the
paradox.
3
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actually behave when put in a state of absentmindedness. We can thus
explore whether they exhibit inconsistencies (as postulated by PR’s paradox)
or act as if they consisted of “multiple selves” therefore letting the paradox
disappear (as argued by AHP).
To these two approaches we add a third one rooted in behavioral consid-
erations. The theoretical analyses of PR and AHP assume that a decision
maker is able to perform sophisticated calculations over the distribution of
beliefs about the states of the world. We argue instead that an absent-
minded individual, not knowing where she is during the journey, brings to
mind a speciﬁc contingency, such as being at the second intersection, and
is inclined to act accordingly. Thus, the individual would tend to exit more
than dictated by her planning strategy because of the occurrence of “being
at the second intersection” in her mentally constructed hypothetical state
of the world, rather than because of sophisticated optimization over beliefs.
Our experiment is constructed in a way which enables us to juxtapose the
predictions of the three approaches. Each participant in the experiment goes
through both a planning stage and an action stage. In the planning stage,
the participants choose only one behaviorial strategy to be independently
implemented at both exits. In the action stage, the participants choose
two behavioral strategies, one for each exit. Absentmindedness in the ac-
tion stage is manipulated in two diﬀerent ways, which we term “induced
absentmindedness” (henceforth IND treatment) and “imposed absentmind-
edness” (henceforth IMP treatment). To gain insight into the underlying
process, namely to distinguish between PR optimization and our cognitive
explanation, we ask participants in the action stage of both the IMP and
IND treatments to guess and bet on which intersection their current deci-
sion applies to. If decision makers construct a mental hypothetical state of
the world, we predict that they will base both their guesses and their game
decisions on this mental state. Thus, time inconsistencies, if any, should be
correlated with the guesses in the sense that participants should exit more
when they believe to be at the second exit. Since eliciting beliefs may change
people’s behavior (e.g., by creating a demand to choose a strategy consistent
with the stated beliefs) we control for this by running treatments without
belief elicitation.
To induce absentmindedness we build upon an innovative procedure re-
4
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the divided attention technique (see, e.g., Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963; Kah-
neman, 1973) by which participants’ cognitive resources are overloaded with
multiple tasks. The method relies on cognitive overload (resulting from in-
formation abundance) to make participants forget their own past decisions.6
In our experiment, similar to Deck and Sarangi (2009), we cognitively
overload participants by asking them to consider and decide on many driving
“maps”, with each map representing an independent payoﬀ-earning game of
the type depicted in Figure 1. Compared to Deck and Sarangi (2009), we
enlarge the set of maps presented to the participants both by increasing the
number of game trees (deﬁned by the payoﬀs a, b, and c) and creating four
maps per game tree by using diﬀerent colors. In order to recognize a map, a
participant therefore must remember not only the payoﬀs, but also the color
and the combination thereof. The use of diﬀerent colors also contributes to
the reliability of the strategies’ estimation, as each participant essentially
makes each decision four times. Additionally, we do not impose any time
limit on choices, although we strongly encourage participants to make each
decision rather fast.
In the IND treatment, the order in which exits appear throughout the
action stage corresponds to the natural one. Namely, for each map, the sec-
ond exit always appears after the ﬁrst one, with at least one other map in
between. Keeping the exits to the natural order has the drawback that ﬁrst
decision nodes X are more likely to appear early in the stage. Therefore,
timing can serve as a signal for the current node: a participant, although
absentminded, may conjecture to be at X, and consequently decide to “con-
tinue” with high probability, during the early part of the stage switching this
strategy sometime midway through the stage. This participant would emu-
late the behavior of a non-absentminded individual and show contingencies
between guesses and actual nodes.
To control for this experimental artifact, we introduce the IMP treat-
ment, in which participants make their two decisions knowing that a deci-
sion is randomly matched to one exit in order to determine the payoﬀ. More
6When people must process large amounts of information within a short time span, the
limited capacity of their short-term memory causes cognitive overload (see, e.g., Kareev
and Warglien 2003). Short-term memory capacity refers to the number of items that an
individual can retain at one time and is classically estimated to be 7 ± 2 (Miller 1956;
Shiﬀrin 1976; Kareev 2000; but see Cowan 2001 for a lower estimate).
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X and the second decision to decision node Y , and with probability 0.5 the
order of the nodes is reversed. Although it imposes absentmindedness by
deﬁnition, this treatment may alter the optimal strategy as participants can
increase their expected payoﬀ by choosing “continue” at one decision node
and “exit” at the other (this argument is elaborated in Section 6(e) of AHP).
To circumvent this issue, we use the same procedure in the IMP treatment
as in the IND treatment. This procedure precludes the use of the above
strategy since the cognitive overload makes it diﬃcult to identify diﬀerent
instances of the same map, and therefore to employ diﬀerent strategies at
the two diﬀerent nodes.7
Our results generally indicate signiﬁcant time inconsistencies across treat-
ments and paradox trees, in line with PR. The belief data supports our
cognitive interpretation of the eﬀect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents the formal arguments of PR and AHP. In Section 3 we develop
our behavioral approach. Section 4 details the experimental design and
experimental implementations of imperfect recall. Section 5 discusses our
experimental results, and Section 6 has some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical background
Consider the absentminded decision problem shown in Figure 1. Denote the
probability of “continue”, which deﬁnes the behavioral strategy, by p. At the
planning stage, the decision problem is to maximize (1−p)a+p(1−p)b+p2c






Take now into account the action stage. Once the driver is on the road
and arrives at an intersection, she does not know whether this is the ﬁrst
or second intersection. Let α be the probability the driver assigns to being
at X, and let H(p,q,α) be the expected payoﬀ given the probability to
7Our data conﬁrms that participants were unable to follow this strategy, which would
lead to an overall probability to “continue” of 0.5.
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take the probability of “continue” at the current and at the other node as
being the same and therefore maximize H(p,p,α) = α[(1−p)a+p(1−p)b+
p2c] + (1 − α)[(1 − p)b + pc] over p, holding α ﬁxed. Solving this problem
yields:
(2) ¯ p =
α(2b − a − c) + c − b
2α(b − c)
,
which is strictly smaller than p∗ for any α < 1. Thus, in PR’s argumentation,
unless the driver believes, unreasonably, to be at the ﬁrst node X with
probability 1, her optimal strategy at the action stage is inconsistent with
her optimal plan.
AHP claim that PR’s analysis is “ﬂawed” (p. 102) in its formulation.
They observe that “when at one intersection, he (the driver) can determine
the action only there, and not at the other intersection − where he isn’t”
and “whatever reasoning obtains at one (intersection) must obtain also at
the other” (p. 104). Accordingly, the planning-optimal strategy p∗ is also
action-optimal if it maximizes payoﬀ at the action stage assuming that p∗
is played at the other intersection. In AHP’s analysis, the expected payoﬀ
at the action stage is
(3) H(p,q,α) = α[(1 − p)a + p(1 − q)b + pqc] + (1 − α)[(1 − p)b + pc],
where α is not held ﬁxed, but is determined by q; in particular, it is the
consistent belief α = 1
1+q.8
Suppose that the strategy at the other intersection is the one prescribed
by the optimal plan p∗ as deﬁned in (1), i.e., q = p∗ = (b−a)/(2(b−c)). Then
the probability that the current intersection is X is α = 2(b−c)/(3b−2c−a).
Substituting q for (b−a)/(2(b−c)) and α for 2(b−c)/(3b−2c−a) into (3),
the expected payoﬀ from choosing “continue” at the current intersection






3b − 2c − a
) =
b(a + b) − 2ac
3b − a − 2c
,
which does not depend on p. Hence p = p∗ maximizes (4) and therefore
8For a discussion of consistent beliefs under absentmindedness and their relation to
Bayesian updating, see Section 5 in PR.
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sentminded driver problem studied here the planning-optimal strategy is the
unique action-optimal strategy. Furthermore, the planning-optimal strategy
is always action-optimal. Although, in general, there may exist other strate-
gies that are action-optimal, they are not available to the agent at the action
stage as q must be taken to be the optimal strategy already determined in
the planning stage.
3 Behavioral hypothesis
It is well established that people do not make decisions under uncertainty
according to the normative principles of expected utility theory. Among the
theoretical models which have been put forth to provide a faithful descrip-
tion of how people think, some maintain that boundedly rational individuals
make their decisions on the basis of sampled speciﬁc instances (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1995; 1997; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998). Experimental evi-
dence supports the view that decisions are driven by a sample drawn from
memory or experiences (Fiedler, 2000; Kareev, 2000; Erev et al., 2010).
Although in the question at hand there is no experience to sample from,
Erev et al. (2008) suggest that the sample used as basis for decisions un-
der uncertainty may come not only from empirical distributions, but also
from objective distributions. For decisions under absentmindedness, such
an objective probability distribution exists in the form of beliefs about the
decision nodes in the information set, as provided by α.
We propose a simple decision process in which one state of the world is
sampled from the objective distribution to inﬂuence decision making. Such
a cognitive process is likely to eﬀect time inconsistencies in a way which is
similar, but not identical, to PR. More speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that the
decision maker uses the probability distribution over the two decision nodes
to mentally generate a realization of a possible state of the world. This
mental state leads her to act in accordance with that realization. Thus,
insofar as the decision maker assigns some probability to being at the sec-
ond decision node, she will sometimes mentally sample the state of being
at Y and tend to exit. We shall refer to this process as case-based time
inconsistencies, or CBTI.
To formalize this hypothesis in Figure 1’s problem, denote by σi the
8
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(i ∈ {X,Y }) if she knew that i would be the actual state of the world. With
probability α the absentminded driver mentally samples node X, which in-
duces a tendency to move according to σX, and with complementary prob-
ability, 1 − α, she mentally samples Y , which induces a tendency to move
according to σY .9 This tendency should be interpreted as a shift from the
planning-optimal strategy p∗ to a convex combination of p∗ and σi where the
weight given to p∗ is independent of i. Accordingly, the expected observed
mean strategy, ˆ p, should lie between p∗ and the expected σi:
min(p∗,ασX + (1 − α)σY ) < ˆ p < max(p∗,ασX + (1 − α)σY ).
In the following we will show that:
(5) ασX + (1 − α)σY < p∗,
so that ˆ p < p∗, and CBTI indeed leads to time inconsistency, in the same
direction as that predicted by PR. First note that the driver always wishes
to exit at Y , implying σY = 0. Therefore inequality (5) reduces to:
(6) ασX < p∗.
When a > c, it is not obvious what one should do at X because the
action-optimal strategy hinges upon the choice at Y . In this case, the
strategy at X can be construed to be the same as in the planning stage,
i.e. σX = p∗. Condition (6) thus implies that the driver would not like to
follow her planning-optimal strategy as long as α < 1, therefore exhibiting
time inconsistency.
On the other hand, if c > a, wishing to continue at the ﬁrst intersection
is a dominant strategy, i.e. σX = 1. In such a case, time inconsistency arises
due to the assumption that the states of the world are mentally sampled in
relation to α. In our experiment the objective α is 0.5 (each map is indeed
presented to the participants twice). Since c > a implies p∗ > 0.5, inequality
9Here we assume a simple sampling process from the distribution given by α. The pre-
dictions of the hypothesis remain qualitatively unchanged if this assumption is somewhat
relaxed, insofar as X (Y ) is mentally sampled with a probability that is weakly increasing
(decreasing) in α, and symmetry holds in the sense that if α = 0.5, then each node is
sampled with equal probability.
9
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The case with c = a is somewhat ambiguous because σX = 1 is only
weakly dominant. Although it seems still reasonable to take σX = 1, this
would imply ˆ p = p∗ = 0.5 and hence no time inconsistency. Therefore CBTI
has no clear predictions.
4 Experimental design
To disentangle the predictions of the three diﬀerent approaches presented
in the previous sections, the experiment consisted of two phases: the plan-
ning stage where participants had to provide their plan before starting the
“journey”, and the action stage in which participants had to indicate their
choices during the journey. According to AHP, no diﬀerence in behavior be-
tween the stages should be detected. According to PR, participants should
always exit more in the action stage. Finally, according to CBTI, partici-
pants should systematically exit more in the action stage only in the periods
when they guess to be at the second node.
4.1 Phase 1: Planning stage
The ﬁrst phase involved sequential decisions. In this phase, participants
were shown 14 game trees of the type depicted in Figure 1 in 4 diﬀerent
colors (yellow, green, blue, purple) so that they faced a total of 56 maps.11
For every map, each participant had to specify her behavioral strategy.
To implement the randomizing mechanism associated with behavioral
strategy play, we used a technique similar to that provided by Huck and
M¨ uller (2002). Participants were asked to imagine an urn with 100 balls.
They could determine the composition of the urn, i.e., how many balls would
stand for “exit” and how many for “continue”. Once the composition of
the urn was decided, the computer randomly drew one ball from the urn
(afterwards replaced). If the ball showed “exit”, then the participant had
to take the ﬁrst exit and earned a. If the ball showed “continue”, then the
participant continued to the second exit and the computer randomly drew




11Recall that a “map” is uniquely identiﬁed by both the game tree (and thus the payoﬀs)
and the color.
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the second exit and earned b; otherwise, the participant stayed to the end
and earned c.
For each of the 56 maps, participants were asked to indicate their desired
mixture of “exit” and “continue” balls in two boxes; i.e., they had to enter
a number in both the “exit”-box and the “continue”-box, where the two
numbers had to add up to 100. We made clear that the strategy chosen
by a participant referred to both exits. Although this procedure allowed
participants to implement randomized strategies, participants could, if they
wanted to, enter 100 in one box and 0 in the other, therefore playing a pure
strategy.
To familiarize participants with the task − including both the game form
and the randomization procedure − we gave them 15 minutes of practice
to experiment with diﬀerent payoﬀs and strategies. Participants ﬁlled in
payoﬀs in a blank tree and indicated a behavioral strategy, after which they
received the resulting probability distributions over outcomes as well as the
expected payoﬀ. Next, particular payoﬀ realizations could be obtained by
pressing a “travel”-button repeatedly.
4.2 Phase 2: Action stage
The second phase of the experiment corresponds to the action stage. In
this phase, participants encountered each map twice, never consecutively.
In addition to the 56 maps shown during the planning stage, participants
were presented with 16 (4 trees × 4 colors) ﬁller maps. Given that each
of the 72 maps was shown twice, the action stage consisted of 144 game
decisions/periods.
For every map, participants had to indicate two strategies, one for each
exit. Strategies were elicited employing the same randomization technique as
in the ﬁrst phase.12 Participants were required to decide twice on each map
regardless of their decision the ﬁrst time they observed the map; i.e., hav-
ing chosen to exit with certainty at the ﬁrst exit (p = 0) did not exclude
making a choice for the second exit. Although this procedure somewhat al-
ters the original game,13 the theoretical analysis of Section 2 remains valid
12Although people, in reality, can choose only one of the two actions, we allow partic-
ipants to randomize in the action stage for being consistent not only with the planning
stage, but also with the theoretical models (which allow for randomizing).
13In the original game, the probability of being at each node depends on the strategy
11
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the original game.
Depending on how absentmindedness was brought about and on whether
beliefs were elicited or not we discriminate among four treatments.
4.2.1 Inducing and imposing absentmindedness
In the IND treatment the payoﬀ for each map was computed in the natural
way; i.e., the ﬁrst time a participant saw a map, her decision applied to the
ﬁrst exit, and the second time she observed the same map, her decision ap-
plied to the second exit. Thus, the experiment’s timing could have served as
a cue for the current exit. To avoid this shortcoming, in the IMP treatment,
the payoﬀ for each map was determined by randomly matching decisions
with exits. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst time a participant saw a map, her decision
could apply to the ﬁrst or second exit with 50% probability each; the second
time that map was presented, her decision would apply to the other exit.
When participants start the action stage, their memory is not overloaded
yet and thus they might remember the maps that were displayed.14 There-
fore only ﬁller maps were used in the ﬁrst (and the last) 10 periods.
4.2.2 Belief elicitation
Given the importance of beliefs to disentangling CBTI from PR’s argument,
we elicited point beliefs about the exit at which a participant thinks to be.15
Moreover, in the IND treatment (where absentmindedness is achieved by
means of cognitive overload), the elicited beliefs serve as a memory test,
aimed at verifying how well participants can recall, and thus whether or not
they are absentminded.
The elicitation procedure was as follows. In each period, participants
were asked to guess whether they were at the ﬁrst or second exit and to
place a bet on their guess being correct. Speciﬁcally, participants were
asked to choose one of the three options depicted in Table 1. Each option
is associated with a gain and a loss depending on the guess being correct
chosen endogenously by the decision maker.
14At the very beginning of treatment IND, participants know with certainty that their
decisions are for the ﬁrst exit.
15In the IMP treatment beliefs are tantamount to guessing the outcome of a fair coin
toss.
12
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maps, even though the concomitant possibility of losses should urge those
who suﬀer from imperfect recall to select option A.16
Table 1: Elicitation of beliefs about the current decision node
Your choice Option If your guess is correct If your guess is wrong
you WIN you LOSE
◦ A 1 1
◦ B 3 5
◦ C 5 15
To control for a possible impact of belief elicitation on participants’
choices, we conducted both the IMP and IND treatments also without elicit-
ing beliefs. Therefore, our experiment comprises four treatments: IMP with
and without belief elicitation (henceforth IMP-With and IMP-Without),
IND with and without belief elicitation (henceforth IND-With and IND-
Without).
4.3 Experimental game trees
The game trees used in the experiment are shown in Table 2. Trees 1–14 were
presented to the participants in both phases. Trees 15–18 were presented in
phase 2 only: they are ﬁller trees, which we exclude from all analyses.
In addition to ten paradox trees, we included two optimal exit and two
optimal stay trees, where the existence of a dominant strategy excludes time
inconsistencies due to absentmindedness. The optimal stay trees have the
largest payoﬀ at the end (i.e., c > a,b). The optimal exit trees have the
largest payoﬀ at the ﬁrst exit (i.e., a > b,c). The unique optimal pure
strategy in these trees is “continue” at both stages and “exit” at both stages,
respectively. Hence, recall plays no role. Behavior in these trees will provide
a check of participants’ understanding of the task.
16The numbers in Table 1 are chosen so that the expected payoﬀ from option A exceeds
the expected payoﬀ from the other two options whenever the probability assigned to being
correct is lower than 2/3. Only if the probability of being correct is greater than 5/6, a
risk neutral decision maker should opt for C.
13
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Tree number a b c p∗ α = 1/(1 + p∗) ¯ p Tree type
1 20 50 30 0.75 0.57 0.38 Paradox
2 10 80 30 0.70 0.59 0.35 Paradox
3 0 40 10 0.67 0.60 0.33 Paradox
4 10 50 20 0.67 0.60 0.33 Paradox
5 30 90 40 0.60 0.63 0.30 Paradox
6 30 70 30 0.50 0.67 0.25 Paradox
7 20 80 10 0.43 0.70 0.21 Paradox
8 30 60 20 0.38 0.73 0.19 Paradox
9 30 70 10 0.33 0.75 0.17 Paradox
10 30 50 10 0.25 0.80 0.13 Paradox
11 50 10 30 Optimal exit
12 60 40 20 Optimal exit
13 20 10 50 Optimal stay
14 10 30 60 Optimal stay
15 0 50 10 Filler
16 10 80 40 Filler
17 30 90 50 Filler
18 10 60 20 Filler
4.4 Procedures
The computerized experiment was conducted in the controlled environment
of the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, Ger-
many) in April and December 2009. It was programmed in z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). The participants were undergraduate students from the
Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena. They were recruited using the ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004) software. Upon entering the laboratory, the participants
were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals. The in-
structions distributed at the beginning informed the participants that the
experiment consisted of two phases, and explained the rules of the ﬁrst phase
only. Written instructions on the second phase were distributed at the end
of the ﬁrst one (a translation of the German instructions for both phases is
reproduced in the Appendix). Before starting the experiment, participants
had to answer a control questionnaire testing their comprehension of the
rules.
We ran two sessions per treatment. Thirty-six students participated in
each treatment (so that a total of 144 participants were involved in the
14
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maps (and thus periods) beforehand. Moreover, they did not receive any
information on the random draws determining their period-payoﬀ or on the
earnings from their guesses until the end of the experiment.
Each session lasted about two hours. Money in the experiment was de-
noted in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), where 10 ECU = 7 euro cents.
Participants were informed that the sum of all payoﬀs accumulated during
the several periods of the two phases would determine their ﬁnal monetary




We use the data from phase 1 (planning stage) to check whether partici-
pants understood the task they were facing and behaved according to the
incentives. Since phase 1 is the same for all four treatments, we pool the
data across treatments and rely on 144 individual observations.18
For optimal stay and optimal exit trees, we expect participants to be-
have optimally in close to 100% of the decisions. Table 3 shows that, in
the planning stage, the proportion of optimal choices for trees 11 to 14 is
above 90% and the mean strategy is to take the optimal action with over
0.95 probability (see columns (1) and (3), respectively). The proportion of
optimal choices is lower in the action stage, but the mean strategies are close
to optimal.
Due to the participants’ computational limitations, we do not expect
continue choices in the paradox trees to be perfectly aligned with the optimal
p∗. Yet, if participants are sensitive to the payoﬀs they can obtain from each
tree, then their choices should be correlated with the optimal strategy across
trees. Averaging over the 144 participants for each of the 10 paradox trees,
we ﬁnd that choices in these trees are indeed signiﬁcantly correlated with p∗
(ρ = 0.906, p < 0.001).
17By paying a small monetary amount over a large number of periods we try to induce
risk neutrality.
18For each participant and each tree, we take the average over the four colors.
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Tree
Proportion of optimal choices Mean Choice
Plan Action Plan Action
(1) (2) (3) (4)
11 92.01% 56.16% 2.071 22.56
12 93.58% 77.60% 1.988 6.858
13 92.36% 84.03% 96.785 94.77
14 92.88% 87.59% 97.500 96.14
5.2 Planning vs. action
The mean strategies by paradox tree, phase and treatment are summarized
in Tables 4 and 5. A graphical representation of the same data is provided
in Figure 2, where the trees are ordered on the horizontal axis by p∗.
The mean strategies are lower in the action stage than in the planning
stage for all 10 paradox trees and in all four treatments (compare column
(1) with (2) and column (7) with (8) in Tables 4 and 5). This diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant in all but 3 cases, according to Wilcoxon signed
rank tests with continuity correction relying on 36 independent observations
(see columns (3) and (9) in the tables). Overall, the probability assigned to
continue in the action stage is, on average, 85.1% and 69.0% of that assigned
in the planning stage, in treatments IMP and IND, respectively.
Table 6 reports the results of two generalized linear random-eﬀects mod-
els (based on Poisson distributions) regressing continue choices on Phase
(which takes values 1 and 2) while controlling for p∗, belief elicitation (BE,
which equals 1 for the treatment with belief elicitation and 0 otherwise),
and the interaction of BE with p∗ and Phase.
The estimated coeﬃcient on Phase is negative and highly signiﬁcant in
both treatments, thereby conﬁrming that participants tend to continue less
in the action stage whatever the manipulation of absentmindedness. In the
IMP treatment, continue choices do not depend on belief elicitation (the
coeﬃcient on BE is not signiﬁcant), and are positively correlated with p∗
regardless of whether beliefs are elicited or not. Moreover, the negative
eﬀect of Phase on continue choices is less pronounced when BE = 1 (i.e.,
with belief elicitation). Turning to the IND treatment, continue choices are
weakly signiﬁcantly higher with belief elicitation whereas the other eﬀects
16
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IMP-WITH IMP-WITHOUT
Tree p∗ Plan Action
Plan vs. Action Action Action β = X vs. β = Y
Plan Action
Plan vs. Action
p-valuea β = X β = Y p-valueb p-valuea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 75.000 61.458 56.361 0.036 61.617 47.602 0.001 63.882 58.427 0.085
2 70.000 63.181 61.844 0.278 66.753 54.351 0.003 67.840 60.601 0.023
3 66.667 74.076 69.354 0.006 73.907 61.419 0.002 80.007 76.177 0.221
4 66.667 60.722 59.132 0.391 63.324 51.602 0.002 63.840 58.028 0.066
5 60.000 56.667 51.302 0.047 55.918 43.377 0.001 61.028 50.962 0.002
6 50.000 50.653 41.545 0.001 45.244 36.653 0.001 53.250 43.059 0.001
7 42.857 43.174 34.556 0.003 35.727 32.514 0.016 48.035 35.385 0.000
8 37.500 42.389 34.194 0.000 35.888 31.059 0.005 43.778 34.604 0.000
9 33.333 39.215 30.299 0.000 29.965 30.793c 0.025 42.917 30.375 0.000
10 25.000 36.993 30.490 0.020 31.849 27.449 0.070 40.875 30.028 0.000
a Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with continuity correction relying on 36 independent observations (averages over the 4 colors for each
participant).
b Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with continuity correction. Number of independent observations for each map: N1 = 25; N2 = N3 = 28;
Nm = 27 for m = 4,...,9; N10 = 28.
c The lower mean for β = X, compared to β = Y , is due to an outlier. The corresponding medians are 30 and 25. Thus, the signiﬁcant result
reﬂects a diﬀerence in the predicted direction.
1
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IND-WITH IND-WITHOUT
Tree p∗ Plan Action
Plan vs. Action Action Action β = X vs. β = Y
Plan Action
Plan vs. Action
p-valuea β = X β = Y p-valueb p-valuea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 75.000 62.951 42.278 0.000 73.161 33.805 0.000 63.743 49.701 0.000
2 70.000 67.799 41.806 0.000 72.070 28.921 0.000 68.167 50.660 0.000
3 66.667 77.965 44.410 0.000 84.372 29.567 0.000 76.646 53.448 0.000
4 66.667 65.993 40.257 0.000 70.650 28.567 0.000 61.875 48.274 0.000
5 60.000 63.278 39.899 0.000 72.490 23.604 0.000 60.507 43.549 0.000
6 50.000 52.903 35.139 0.000 69.574 18.454 0.000 53.750 35.833 0.000
7 42.857 44.146 29.948 0.001 55.833 15.753 0.000 48.889 33.198 0.000
8 37.500 46.222 30.101 0.000 55.075 20.495 0.000 45.174 35.122 0.000
9 33.333 41.604 29.385 0.000 51.117 18.856 0.000 46.215 32.528 0.000
10 25.000 40.382 31.333 0.000 49.040 19.991 0.000 45.139 30.472 0.000
a Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with continuity correction relying on 36 independent observations (averages over the 4 colors for each
participant).
b Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with continuity correction. Number of independent observations for each map: N1 = 31; N2 = 26;
N3 = N4 = 32; N5 = 31; N6 = 29; N7 = 27; N8 = N9 = 30; N10 = 33.
1
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 035Table 6: Time inconsistencies: Generalized linear mixed-eﬀects regression on
continue choices
IMPOSE INDUCE
Coeﬀ Std.Error p-value Coeﬀ Std.Error p-value
Intercept 26.022 2.195 0.0000 49.234 2.701 0.0000
Phase −10.313 0.651 0.0000 −17.094 0.882 0.0000
BEa −0.868 3.085 0.7794 6.433 3.737 0.0896
p∗ 0.793 0.017 0.0000 0.488 0.023 0.0000
BE×Phase 1.521 0.906 0.0931 −2.824 1.206 0.0192
BE×p∗ −0.0658 0.024 0.0067 −0.108 0.030 0.0004
a BE is 1 for the treatments with belief elicitation and 0 otherwise.
are as in IMP. We conclude that time inconsistencies exist in the data, in
line with PR’s argument and in contradiction to the normative analysis of
AHP.
The eﬀect of belief elicitation on participants’ behavior is also explored
via a series of two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests comparing the 36 in-
dependent continue choices in IMP-With (IND-With) and IMP-Without
(IND-Without). The p-values (reported in Table 7) conﬁrm that for all but
three trees belief elicitation does not aﬀect behavior.
Table 7: Comparing continue choices with and without
belief elicitation in the action stage
Tree
IMPOSE INDUCE
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Before addressing the main issue of contingencies between beliefs and game
decisions and the eﬀect of timing in the IND treatment, we look at the bets
made on the beliefs to ascertain the extent to which the participants feel
absentminded. Taking the betting choices in treatment IMP as a baseline,
we ﬁnd that, overall, participants were unlikely to choose the risky bets
B and C. In fact, participants are even more likely to choose the safe
option A in IND compared to IMP (84.2% vs. 79.4%). Choices of the highly
risky option C are quite rare in both treatments, although more frequent
in IND (4.9% vs. 2.0%), where option B is selected less frequently (10.8%
vs. 18.5%). We conclude that, moving from the IMP to the IND treatment,
the shift to the cautious option A is larger in magnitude than the shift to
the risky option C. This indicates that participants are not systematically
more conﬁdent about their bets in treatment IND than in treatment IMP,
in which they are absentminded by deﬁnition.
The mean continue choices by stated beliefs (labelled β) are presented
in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 4 and 5. The mean strategy chosen when
participants guess to be at node Y is signiﬁcantly lower than that chosen
when participants guess to be at node X for all 10 trees and for both IMP-
With treatment and IND-With treatment, in line with the CBTI prediction.
To test the correlation between stated beliefs and game strategies while
controlling for other variables, we use the generalized linear random-eﬀect
models reported in Table 8. The model regresses continue choices on Belief,
controlling for p∗, Actual node and Period.
Continue choices are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the
stated beliefs. However, in the IND-With treatment this result can be due
to participants not being absentminded, i.e., knowing which decision node
they are at. Indeed, in Model 1 of the IND-With panel, strategies are also
correlated with the actual decision node, indicating that participants’ beliefs
are more accurate than expected by chance. Yet, this can happen not only if
participants can recall their history, but also if they use the period as a cue.
To control for this possibility, we perform Model 2 (which includes Period
among the covariates). We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the actual node disappears
when controlling for Period, while the eﬀect of Belief remains unchanged.
In line with the unequivocal correspondence between beliefs and decisions
observed in the IMP-With treatment, we conclude that, in the IND-With
21
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IMP-WITH IND-WITH
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeﬀ. p-value Coeﬀ. p-value Coeﬀ. p-value Coeﬀ. p-value
Intercept 23.227 0.000 23.667 0.000 83.226 0.000 82.079 0.000
(2.803) (2.822) (2.974) (2.999)
Belief −11.338 0.000 −11.280 0.000 −37.341 0.000 −37.079 0.000
(0.745) (0.746) (0.936) (0.939)
p∗ 0.755 0.000 0.759 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.388 0.000
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Actual node −0.352 0.525 −0.342 0.537 −2.243 0.001 −0.350 0.704
(0.554) (0.554) (0.679) (0.921)
Period −0.012 0.171 −0.048 0.002
(0.009) (0.016)
Note Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors.
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This observation supports the CBTI hypothesis.
6 Conclusions
The vast majority of theoretical and experimental research eﬀort to un-
derstand rational decision making has so far been conﬁned to situations of
perfect recall. Nonetheless, imperfect recall is likely to play a signiﬁcant
role in many real-world decision problems. Firms or countries, for exam-
ple, are often modeled as single players, although diﬀerent elements in their
strategies have to be decided by diﬀerent agents, sometimes lacking informa-
tion about the decisions of other parts of the aggregate player (cf. Binmore,
1996). Furthermore, even a single person is likely to suﬀer from imperfect
recall as storing and accessing huge amounts of information is practically
impossible.
Some issues arising from imperfect recall are well illustrated by the para-
dox of the absentminded driver (Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997b).19 This
paper joins the theoretical eﬀorts devoted to the paradox, and complements
the theoretical discussions by providing a positive analysis of the problem.
Speciﬁcally, we report on an experiment designed to compare behavior in a
planning stage and an action stage of a decision problem featuring absent-
mindedness. In the minimal setting, as implemented in our IMP treatment,
the decision task is almost identical in the two stages, with the only diﬀerence
being that in the action stage participants provide two strategies, whereas in
the planning stage they provide a single strategy to be implemented twice.
Despite the fact that payoﬀ is maximized by the same strategy in both
cases, we ﬁnd that this diﬀerence is enough to lead to a systematic variance
in behavior, as predicted by Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a). Namely, par-
ticipants tend to exit more in the action stage than in the planning stage.
This result is supported by the ﬁndings in the IND treatment, in which
absentmindedness is implemented in a more natural way.
Examining the elicited beliefs, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between
stated beliefs and game strategy: participants assign, on average, a lower
probability to continue when they guess to be at the second (rather than the
19Other directions of research focus on the analysis of players with bounded complexity
(see, e.g., Abreu and Rubinstein 1988; Lehrer, 1988).
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not make a normative distinction between diﬀerent times in which an infor-
mation set is reached. It is, however, predicted by the “case-based time in-
consistencies” hypothesis. According to our interpretation, participants are
not cognitively equipped to deal with probabilistic constructs such as dis-
tributions, but are able to mentally represent concrete instances. Therefore
they generate a deterministic state of the world based on the distribution,
and act according to it. This process leads to a contingency between deci-
sions and stated beliefs, as both are based on the same mentally constructed
state of the world.
We should note that the contingency between beliefs and strategies is
merely correlational, in our design as well as in theory. Therefore we cannot
completely rule out alternative explanations. One such explanation is that
trembles in the strategy lead to systematically diﬀerent beliefs driven by a
preference for consistency. However, this explanation does not rationalize
why planning and action decisions should diﬀer. Hence, it cannot account
for the observed diﬀerence between plans and actions, which is apparent re-
gardless of belief elicitation. Our interpretation, on the other hand, provides
a uniﬁed process which fully predicts and organizes the data.
Our results are also related to the theoretical analysis developed by Bin-
more (1996), who modeled the absentminded driver paradox as a repeated
decision problem, somewhat akin to our action stage. It is noteworthy that
the behavior we observe in the action stage conforms to the normative pre-
scription of Binmore (1996), although he assumes that the decision maker
can remember all her past decisions and thus derive a frequency-based belief
over decision nodes. Conversely, our participants did not receive feedback
between maps and encountered each decision node twice.
To sum, we provide conclusive descriptive evidence for the existence of
the time inconsistencies predicted by PR, and elucidate the process driving
these inconsistencies. In this paper we focus on the problem of the absent-
minded driver, which was at the center of the theoretical debate. We leave
it for future research to study the implications of the case-based reasoning
theory resented here for more general situations.
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This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) we used for
the IND-With treatment. The instructions for the other treatments were
adapted accordingly and are available upon request.
Instructions
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please remain quiet and
switch oﬀ your mobile phone. Stow away any reading or writing materials: your
table should contain only these instructions. Do not speak to the other participants.
Communication between participants will lead to the automatic end of the session
with no payment to anyone. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will come to your place.
You will receive 2.50 euros for having shown up on time. The experiment allows
you to earn additional money. Since your earnings during the experiment will
depend on your decisions, and may depend on chance, the better you understand
the instructions, the more money you will be able to earn.
In this experiment you will not interact with any other participant. The de-
cisions of the other participants will not aﬀect your earnings and, similarly, your
decisions will not aﬀect the earnings of the other participants.
During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros but rather of ECU (Ex-
perimental Currency Unit). ECU are converted to euros at the following exchange
rate: 10 ECU = 7 euro cents.
Detailed information on the experiment







of travel  
When you approach Exit 1, you have to decide whether you want to continue
on the highway or you want to take that exit. If you decide to take Exit 1, then
you terminate your journey. Otherwise, you continue to Exit 2, where again you
must decide whether to continue on the highway or to exit. The numbers on the
highway tell you the amount of money in ECU that you would earn based on where
you choose to go. In the example above, you would earn: 0 ECU if you take Exit 1;
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exits. In this example, your maximum earnings would be achieved by continuing
at Exit 1 and then taking Exit 2.
In the experiment, you will be shown several highways diﬀering in the amount
of ECU they yield. Each highway will be presented to you in 4 diﬀerent colors
(yellow, green, blue, red). In the following, we shall refer to a highway in a speciﬁc
color as a map. Highways with the same earnings but diﬀerent colors correspond to
diﬀerent maps. You can think of the diﬀerent colors as diﬀerent days in which you
are driving on the same highway. Suppose that you are shown the highway depicted
in the above example ﬁrst in yellow and then in blue. Your travel on the yellow
highway takes place on one day and your travel on the blue highway takes places
on another day. Therefore, your earnings from the two travels are independent of
each other.
The experiment consists of two phases. The instructions for the ﬁrst phase
follow on this page. The instructions for the second phase will be distributed to
you at the end of the ﬁrst phase. This is done to avoid confusion between the two
phases. Your payoﬀ from any of the two phases is determined only by what you do
in that phase and is not aﬀected by what you do in the other phase.
At the end of today’s session, i.e., after the second phase, the amount of ECU
you have earned in each period of the two phases will be added up. The resulting
sum will be converted to euros and paid to you in cash and privately (i.e., without
the other participants knowing your earnings) together with the show-up fee of 2.50
euros.
PHASE 1
There will be a series of periods in this phase. In each period, you will be shown a
map (i.e., a highway in a speciﬁc color). Like in the example above, it is as though
you are starting at the bottom of the map and driving up the highway, and your
payoﬀ will depend on where you go. For each map, you must make a single decision
that applies to both exits.
For each map, you decide as follows. Imagine an urn with 100 balls. You can
determine how many of these balls stand for “continuing” and how many stand for
“exiting”. Once you have decided the composition of the urn, the computerized
program will randomly draw a ball from the urn (and put it back afterward). If
the randomly drawn ball shows “exit”, then you take the ﬁrst exit and earn the
corresponding amount of ECU. If the ball shows “continue”, then you continue to
Exit 2 and the program will randomly draw a second ball from the urn. Depending
on whether the ball shows “continue” or “exit”, you get the corresponding earnings.
To determine the composition of the urn, you must enter a number in each of
the two boxes that you will see on the screen below the map. One box is labeled
“exit” and the other is labeled “continue”. The number you enter in the exit-box
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the continue-box determines the number of continue-balls in the urn. The sum of
the two numbers you enter must be 100.
EXAMPLE 1. If you enter 80 in the continue-box and 20 in the exit-box, then the
urn will contain exactly 80 continue-balls and 20 exit-balls. This means that when
the program randomly draws the ﬁrst ball from the urn, you will have 80% chance
of continuing on the highway and 20% chance of taking Exit 1. If the ﬁrst randomly
drawn ball shows “continue”, then at the second random draw (corresponding to
Exit 2) you will again have 80% chance of continuing on the highway and 20%
chance of taking Exit 2. Therefore you will have 80% × 80% = 64% chance of
continuing beyond Exit 2 and 80% × 20% = 16% chance of taking Exit 2.
EXAMPLE 2. If you enter 40 in the continue-box and 60 in the exit-box, then the
urn will contain exactly 40 continue-balls and 60 exit-balls. This means that when
the program randomly draws the ﬁrst ball from the urn, you will have 40% chance
of continuing on the highway and 60% chance of taking Exit 1. If the ﬁrst randomly
drawn ball shows “continue”, then at the second random draw (corresponding to
Exit 2) you will again have 40% chance of continuing on the highway and 60%
chance of taking Exit 2. Therefore you will have 40% × 40% = 16% chance of
continuing beyond Exit 2 and 40% × 60% = 24% chance of taking Exit 2.
EXAMPLE 3. If you enter 0 in the continue-box and 100 in the exit-box, then the
urn will contain only exit-balls. This means that you will take Exit 1 with certainty.
As it is evident from examples 1 and 2 above, you can make a decision that
does not mean exiting or continuing with certainty. However, if you wish to make
such a decision, you can do so by entering 100 in one box and 0 in the other (like
in example 3 above).
During the two phases of the experiment you will have to make many decisions.
If you make each decision in 20 seconds, the two phases will last more than one
hour. Thus, in order for the experiment to take not too long, we strongly encourage
you to decide rather fast.
You will NOT receive any information about the random draws, and thus your
earnings, until the end of today’s session.
Practice stage
Before the experiment starts you will have 15 minutes of practice to get familiar
with your task. This stage is conducted only to help you learn how the experiment
works, and does not count towards your payoﬀ. During this time you can choose
diﬀerent highways to practice on, and see the consequences of diﬀerent choices for
each highway.
On your screen you will see a highway with three empty payoﬀ-boxes (A, B,
and C in the picture below), one exit-box, and one continue-box.
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In order to choose a highway to experiment with, you have to enter a number
between 0 and 200 in each of the three payoﬀ-boxes A, B, and C. The number
you enter in the payoﬀ-box labeled A stands for the ECU you would earn if you
take Exit 1. Similarly, the numbers you enter in the payoﬀ-boxes labeled B and
C stand for the ECU you would earn if you take Exit 2 or continue at both exits,
respectively.
The exit-box and the continue-box allow you to determine the composition of
the urn from which the program will make the random draw(s) deciding where you
go and thus how much you earn. The numbers you enter in the continue-box and
the exit-box must add up to 100.
Once you have entered a number in each of the 5 boxes, if you press the button
marked “I want to test this highway and this composition of the urn” you will see
on the screen:
• the chances you have to take Exit 1, to take Exit 2, or to continue beyond
Exit 2 based on the numbers you have entered in the continue-box and in
the exit-box;
• the expected payoﬀ in ECU given your choices.
You can change all or some of the numbers you have entered as many times
as you want, and then press the button to know the consequences (as explained
above) of your choices.
After you have chosen a highway and a composition of the urn for that highway,
you can experience “travelling” along the highway and observing whether you end
up in A, B, or C. For that you can press the button marked “Travel”. Each time
you press this button, the program will make the random draw(s) based on your
decision, and show the result. In order to make many travels and see what happens
for each of them, you can press the “Travel”-button as many time as you like.
During the 15 minutes of practice, you can repeat all the steps above as many
times as you wish. Notice that you can enter a number in the three payoﬀ-boxes
only in the practice stage. Thereafter, the payoﬀs that you can earn are given.
Before the practice stage starts, you will have to answer some control questions
to verify your understanding of the rules of the experiment.
Please remain seated quietly until the experiment starts. If you have any ques-
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PHASE 2
In this phase, you will be asked to imagine yourself travelling along the highway.
During your travel you encounter the exits one after the other.
During this phase you will again see a series of maps. But, diﬀerently from
phase 1, you will see each map exactly twice. Since a map is identiﬁed by both a
highway with some earnings and a color and since each highway is shown to you in
4 diﬀerent colors, you will see the same highway 2 × 4 = 8 times, but only twice
in the same color.
The ﬁrst time you see a map, your decision applies to Exit 1; the second time
you see the map, your decision applies to Exit 2. The maps are displayed in a
preselected order and you will never see the same map in two consecutive periods.
Hence the map you will see in period 1 will not be used in period 2, but it may
appear again in period 3, or period 4, or any other period during this second phase.
Like in phase 1, for each map you must decide how many of the 100 balls
contained in an urn should stand for “continuing” and how many for “exiting”.
Below each map you will again see a continue-box and an exit-box, in each of
which you must enter a number. The sum of the two numbers you enter must
always be 100.
What is diﬀerent is that in phase 2, the program will randomly draw only one
ball from the urn. The drawn ball will determine your decision for the current exit
of the shown map. If, for instance, you are shown a map for the ﬁrst time and enter
20 in the exit-box and 80 in the continue-box, you will have 20% chance of taking
Exit 1 and 80% chance of continuing. On the other hand, if you are shown a map
for the second time and enter 50 in the exit-box and 50 in the continue box, you
will have 50% chance of taking Exit 2 and 50% chance of continuing. Of course,
where you end up depends on the two decisions you make for a particular map as
well as on the random draw. The table below shows 3 possible cases.
First time you see a map   Second time you see a map  
(Exit 1 decision)  (Exit 2 decision) 
Earnings
Case 1  10 in exit-box and 90 in continue-box;  50 in exit-box and 50 in continue-box; 
a continue-ball is randomly drawn  a continue-ball is randomly drawn 
10
Case 2  10 in exit-box and 90 in continue-box;  50 in exit-box and 50 in continue-box; 
an exit-ball is randomly drawn  a continue-ball is randomly drawn 
20
Case 3  10 in exit-box and 90 in continue-box;  50 in exit-box and 50 in continue-box; 






Notice that even though you enter 100 in the exit-box (therefore deciding to
exit with certainty) the ﬁrst time you see a map, you will still be shown the map
a second time. In this case it does not matter what decisions you make the second
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You do not know how many periods there are in this phase. During the phase
you will not be informed of how many periods are left, nor of whether you are at
the ﬁrst or second exit of the current map.
For each map, before making your decision about the number of exit-balls and
continue-balls that should be contained in the urn, the computer will ask you to
guess whether you think of being at Exit 1 or at Exit 2; that is, whether you think
to see the current map for the ﬁrst time or for the second time. You will have to
place a bet on your guess being correct by choosing one of the three options shown
below:
If your guess is correct If your guess is wrong
Your choice  Option 
you WIN  you LOSE 
º A 1 1
º B 3 5
º C 5 15
Note that option B and C oﬀer higher payoﬀs if you are correct, but also carry
higher losses if you are wrong. Therefore you are advised to choose option C only if
you are very sure that you are correct, option B if you think that you are probably
correct, and option A if you are very unsure that you are correct.
Please remain seated quietly until the experiment starts. If you have any ques-
tions please raise your hand now.
33
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 035